An Optical Scan E-Voting System based on N-Version Programming by Goirizelaia, Iñaki et al.
E-voting
	 Published	by	the	ieee	ComPuter	soCiety							■						1540-7993/08/$25.00	©	2008	ieee							■						ieee	seCurity	&	PrivaCy	 47	
an	optical	scan		
e-voting	system	based		
on	N-version	Programming
The authors present a multi-agent prototype for an e-voting 
system based on optical character recognition technology. 
This case study demonstrates how using N-version 
programming and improving an e-voting authentication 
system and the resulting data transmission could further 
enhance the security of the electoral process.
R esearchers are working hard to ensure that the e-voting systems used today—and the ones that will be used in the near future1,2—are secure, democratic, and well-designed, 
especially given that there has been concern about 
possible dangers of e-voting systems.3 
For example, when the Irish Government looked 
into e-voting for the 2004 European elections, it 
decided not to use e-voting systems.4 The Com-
mission on Electronic Voting of Ireland concluded 
that, because of public concerns about transparency, 
it couldn’t recommend using the proposed system at 
the local and European elections. Its reports state that 
testability and the ability to audit the ballots would 
help maximize trust in voting systems. But if the au-
dit trail is paper, and requires conventional counting, 
it wouldn’t be able to achieve the accuracy level of 
electronic counting.5 Counting paper ballots by hand 
is a very difficult task when you have lot of different 
questions and different people counting
Here we discuss how we could enhance e-voting 
machines so they could reliably produce separate au-
ditable records of a voter’s selections. Electronic ballot 
copies and other improvements to the auditing capac-
ity of the machines could make voting more secure 
without having to rely on paper. New technologies, 
or even better, new ways of implementing existing 
technologies, might be necessary to fully accomplish 
this goal.6 
We propose improvements to Demotek, an e-
 voting system whose main goal is to count votes 
by reading them automatically.7 Demotek has been 
tested in several local elections in the Basque Coun-
try and in Barcelona, but so far it 
hasn’t been checked in large-scale 
state elections. Our analysis in this article will propose 
new capabilities for this voting system, specifically, 
improvements to the data transmission and authen-
tication system, and will demonstrate that existing 
technology is good enough to provide reliable e-vot-
ing systems.
Demotek experiment
As an experiment in modernization by the Basque 
Government, researchers at the University of the 
Basque Country and authors of this article, working 
together with other research institutions and private 
companies, designed Demotek, an electronic system 
that uses optical character recognition (OCR) to scan 
paper ballots and cast votes, in order to automate the 
voting process. We designed this system to account for 
the electoral requirements of the Spanish and Basque 
electoral laws, such as the use of preprinted party bal-
lots and the need for IDs to identify registered voters.7 
Our electoral law states that each paper ballot repre-
sents the choices of one political party.
Automatic paper ballot reading
With Demotek, an OCR scanner replaces the tra-
ditional transparent ballot box lid with one with an 
OCR scanner and two slots: one for reading and vali-
dation and one for counting (Figure 1).
The ballot resembles traditional ballot papers 
with one electoral possibility printed on it but with 
the addition of a special strip where non-visible text, 
which is only visible using ultraviolet light, is written. 
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Electoral booths have UV light systems so that voters 
can illuminate their paper ballots to check the cor-
respondence between the visible and non-visible text. 
Once the voter has checked it, he or she then folds the 
ballot, covering only the visible text (Figure 1). The 
Demotek prototype secures privacy by scanning UV-
readable labels that voters have checked. Voters give 
their paper ballot to the polling place president, who 
then deposits the ballot into the box through the sec-
ond slot. Paper ballots remain inside the transparent 
ballot box until the end of Election Day. If someone 
wants to audit the results given by the e-voting system, 
the paper ballots are available for manual counting. 
Voter authentication
This process is done manually. Voters present their IDs 
to the polling place president, who checks whether or 
not they’re registered and have the right to vote at that 
particular electronic ballot box. (New digital IDs will 
soon be available for all voters and might be used to 
improve voter authentication.)
Act of voting 
As noted earlier, the act of physically voting means that 
the voter chooses the desired paper ballot and gives it 
to the polling place president—another process that 
could be improved. The most significant criticism to 
our proposal is that the process doesn’t require vot-
ers to examine their ballots for authenticity, much less 
to do this in private. If voters didn’t closely examine 
the ballot’s UV-readable portion, they might mistake 
a fake ballot for a real one. Of course, visual ballots 
must also be interpreted for sightless people.
Vote deposit and increment register
The polling place president presents the paper bal-
lot to the automatic reading system. If the system can 
read the ballot without any problem, it opens the bal-
lot box and the president inserts the ballot correctly. 
Once this is complete, the internal register (register 
memory associated with each political party that’s used 
to count the number of votes of each party) associated 
with the political party in question is incremented, 
and the system updates and displays the total number 
of votes. Representatives of each political party check 
their lists and keep track of who votes, as well as the 
total amount of votes. 
There are several checkpoints during this process. 
First, when the president presents the paper ballot to 
our electronic ballot box, Demotek automatically 
reads it and ensures that the paper ballot is valid. If 
valid, the appropriate ballot box slot opens electroni-
cally. If the president tries to insert more than one 
vote at a time, the sensors will detect it, and the ballot 
box will close. Sensors also detect when the paper bal-
lot is fully inside the box, so the ballot box closes and 
is ready for another vote. 
Closing the electronic ballot box
Once all votes are recorded and secured in the bal-
lot box, the polling place president must close the 
electronic ballot box, using an administrator card de-
signed for that purpose. When he or she presents this 
card to the OCR system, it displays the final results 
and transmits them to the Central Electoral Office 
(where all the results of all the electronic ballot boxes 
are collected and counted) via GSM short messages. 
The president writes the results on the official cer-
tificate; this is the legally valid result for that ballot 
box. Political party representatives should also sign 
this certificate. After the votes have been recorded, 
Demotek erases all the information stored in memory. 
As noted earlier, to verify that the GSM transmission 
was correct, all the votes inside a ballot box can be 
saved as an auditable record.
Demotek vs. other e-voting systems
Table 1 shows the results of the evaluation of the De-
motek proposal for an e-voting system vs. other vot-
ing systems, taking into account how well our system 
responds to the expectations that any voting machine 
must fulfill with regard to electoral tradition in our 
country as well as others. 
Improving Demotek  
with N-version programming 
Our analysis of Demotek shows that it’s a first step 
in the design of new voting technology. Several im-
portant functions could help automate the electoral 
process, but they have either not been implemented 
Non-visible text 
Visible text showing
the option chosen
by the voter
Text to be read by the
electronic ballot box only
visible with ultraviolet light
Figure 1. An example of a ballot for the e-voting system and a folded ballot 
ready to be introduced into the ballot box.
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yet, or could be improved significantly. That’s the 
case with the voter authentication system and with 
data transmission.
Two important goals—compatibility with the 
previous version of Demotek and reliability of exist-
ing technology—must be taken into account when 
improving Demotek’s reliability. As far as software 
development technology is concerned, N-version 
programming techniques would make undetected at-
tacks far more difficult to carry out.8, 9 
An N-version system consists of several software 
modules developed in controlled isolation. We imple-
mented such modules for each function in Demotek. 
A distributed decision algorithm determines that 
each stage of the process has consensus from its mod-
ules.10,11 There has been significant research during 
the past few years in the field of N-version program-
ming;12–14 its main advantage is that there’s no way to 
attack the whole system without separately attacking 
an important number of software modules, making 
hacking the system more difficult. 
Diversity in computer systems refers to systems 
that run on different hardware, operating systems, or 
algorithms, and its a fundamental requirement of N-
version programming.14 With enforced diversity, the 
probability of identical software failures occurring in 
Table 1. Evaluating Demotek.*
PrEPrinTED 
balloT
DEmoTEk 
PrEPrinTED 
DirEcT rEcorD 
ElEcTronic 
wiThouT VoTEr 
VErifiED PaPEr 
auDiT Trail
oPTical mark 
rEcogniTion
rEmoTE inTErnET 
VoTing sysTEm
Privacy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes if no external 
attack
Accuracy Even multiple 
people made two 
to three errors per 
thousand counted
Possible problems 
due to system failure 
or attacks
Possible problems 
due to system failure 
or attacks
Possible problems 
due to system failure 
or attacks
Possible problems 
due to system failure 
or external attacks
Auditability
—Physical
—  Separate record  
of transaction
—  Separate record  
of selection
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Convenience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ballot creation Not flexible Not flexible Very flexible Usually not very 
flexible
Very flexible
Availability Yes Sensitive to system 
failure
Sensitive to system 
failure
Sensitive to system 
failure
Sensitive to system 
failure and external 
attacks
Handicap accessible No No Yes No Yes
Easiness* Very easy Very easy Easy Easy Complex
Automation level Manual Partial Total Almost total Total
Ability to vote  
anytime, anywhere
No No No No Yes
Coercion  
and vote sale
Traditional Traditional Safe Only with physical 
security
Not safe
Compatible with 
electoral tradition in 
Basque Country
Yes Yes No No No
Compatible with 
electoral tradition in 
different countries
Various No Yes Yes Yes
*We evaluated ease of use by surveying participants in a recent university election where the technology was used. In general, the participants found 
the new system as easy to use as the traditional voting system.
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multiple modules at the same time is greatly reduced. 
That’s why we propose forced diversity at each stage.
The N-Version Execution Environment (NVEX) 
is another fundamental component of N-version pro-
gramming. It’s the software or hardware component 
that manages the N individual software modules, con-
structing N-version software units (NVS) from the 
inputs, outputs, and behaviour of individual modules. 
The system uses the decision algorithm to decide if a 
message agrees with enough other messages calculat-
ed by other versions of the software units to be able to 
corroborate its accuracy. This decision will be made 
based on the number of exact matches among input 
XML messages. We improve Demotek by using N-
version programming technology and the philosophy 
behind this concept. Every software module of the 
system is written again with this in mind. We want to 
use this philosophy to make the system more difficult 
to be attacked by hackers.
The use of N-version programming has been criti-
cized, especially when different people recoded the 
same algorithm. Nancy Leveson and John Knight15 
have shown that caution would be appropriate when 
implementing software systems based on N-version 
methodology. This becomes important in those soft-
ware applications “where loss of life is possible, such as 
commercial aircraft” though this isn’t the case when 
used for voting purposes. 
Following those recommendations, we redesigned 
the new version of Demotek as follows:
We made the concept of diversity fundamental to 
the redesign, not only during software develop-
ment, but also for when we establish new voting 
procedures.
Experienced programmers belonging to different 
organizations developed our software. 
We used different algorithms. For instance, we au-
tomatically read paper ballots using two different 
algorithms that run on different operating systems.
We used different data transmission technologies 
(adding redundancy to our system).
We strove to protect our voting system from exter-
nal attacks especially during voter authentication, data 
transmission, and the display of results.
Authentication system improvements
Let’s look at the authentication system more closely. 
Adding an authentication facility to Demotek requires 
some thought about the actual voting process. As noted 
earlier, every voter in the Basque Country must show 
an ID. Figure 2 shows how such a system could be used 
when a person is ready to cast his or her vote. 
Voters now present their ID cards to the authenti-
cation system. Once it’s proven to belong to a regis-
tered voter, the authorities and party representatives 
receive the signal “voter ok,” and the voter may en-
ter the booth. From that point on, only authenticated 
voters are allowed in the booth, having chosen a paper 
ballot without anyone present and therefore without 
the threat of coercion. The voter then casts his or her 
vote, and the e-voting system automatically reads it. 
Simultaneously, the voter receives a code that he or 
she can check against the list of codes published at the 
end of the day to ensure that the vote was counted. 
This code isn’t associated with the voter’s option or 
ID. The exit sensor detects when the voter leaves the 
Central Electoral Office, and the system is then ready 
to authenticate a new voter. 
This process has no way to link a voter’s ID and the 
vote cast given that our electronic ballot box doesn’t 
keep any ordered list of votes in memory.
Casting votes in this manner has another impor-
tant advantage over the way Demotek originally was 
designed. The combination of persons and computers 
can prevent mistakes and many kinds of collusion. For 
instance, the procedure in Figure 2 eliminates op-
portunities for a person to vote twice. For a double 
vote to occur, the poll worker and the system would 
both need to accept that person twice. In this sense, 
the concept of diversity that underlies N-version pro-
gramming is also apparent in this new procedure.
Figure 3 shows the new design we propose to add 
authentication functionality to any e-voting system 
that doesn’t support it. In this case, it’s particularized 
to improve the Demotek e-voting system. 
•
•
•
•
Only one voter
at a time
Paper ballots
provided by
government
Authentication
system
Voter
OK signal
Code display,
exit sensor
Sensor
Electoral
booth
Electoral authorities and
representatives of political parties
Figure 2. Demotek’s authentication system, electoral booth, and e-voting 
ballot box. This voting procedure adds an authentication capability to an 
e-voting system.
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Voters insert their digital IDs into the authenti-
cation machine, inserting it in different readers 
to improve robustness. The digital ID contains, 
among other things, the voter’s PIN and private 
and public keys. The identity number is signed 
and blinded by multiple identity number mod-
ules. The modules use their distributed algorithm 
to demonstrate that they agree about the identity 
number to accept it.
The digitally signed and blinded identity number 
is then transmitted to the ID Check stage by using 
different transmission resources.
All the ID Reception and Checking N version 
programs ensure that the information (after being 
decrypted using the public key) has been trans-
mitted without any problems and that it’s consis-
tent (that is, the decision algorithm evaluates all 
the inputs and says that reception was OK). 
The system, using the algorithm, checks each 
elector’s database versions to determine whether 
the voter is authorized. If accepted, a “voter ok” 
signal is sent to the electoral office president and 
political representatives. This signal also allows 
the voter to enter the booth to verify the UV-
readable party name on a ballot of choice.
The voter casts his or her vote by giving it to the 
polling place president of that electoral office. We 
might add that the usual custom of having rep-
resentatives of the parties present is itself an N-
version approach. At this point, the polling place 
president could also ask for the ID to double check 
that this person is a valid voter. If laws would 
change—and we hope they do—voters could 
place it in the voting box themselves.
Once the vote is inserted in the ballot box, the 
“vote in ballot box” signal is on, and the code 
generator receives it.
The code generator provides a code for each voter 
that’s displayed on a monitor. Voters can write it 
down and use it later to make sure their vote was 
included in the actual count by checking the list 
of codes published at the end of the electoral day. 
By listing these codes, we try to increase voter’s 
confidence in our system. No official paper receipt 
containing the voter’s option (which could be sold 
later) is given to the voter. This validates voting by 
making it clear that all votes have been deposited 
in the ballot box. Finally, the exit sensor detects 
that the voter leaves the electoral office, and the 
system is ready for another voter.
Forced diversity in each stage makes any collusion 
among many programmers incredibly difficult and 
discoverable. The authentication system uses digital 
IDs to identify voters. The encrypted ID information 
is transmitted by at least three different transmission 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
channels. At the following stage, the system receives 
and checks the ID information using at least three 
diverse software versions. At the next stage, three 
electors’ databases are used to check whether that ID 
corresponds to a valid voter. 
Data transmission improvements
Data transmission between each polling place and 
the Central Electoral Office could be accomplished 
using SMS messages and the GSM network, but this 
method is particularly vulnerable to attack. One of 
the best ways to improve data transmission mecha-
nisms in voting technology is to apply existing tech-
nology on top of cryptography techniques, but in a 
different way—in this case, we use the N-version pro-
gramming to reduce external attacks to our system. 
Although today’s networks are robust, if one trans-
mission is intercepted, it won’t reach its destination. 
If, on the other hand, one transmission occurred on 
land lines, another via the Internet, and a third by cell 
phone, the agreement of two of out three would be 
enough to boost security. 
Paper ballot
President,
representatives
political
parties
Voter OK? Voter OK? Voter OK?
4
3
7
ID reception
and checking
v1
ID reception
and checking
v2
ID reception
and checking
vN
Elector’s
database 1
Elector’s
database 2
Elector’s
database N…
…
5
2
6
Electronic
ballot box
MODEM GSM
network
Intranet
Code
generator
Digital ID
1
Figure 3. Voter authentication system based on N-version programming 
techniques showing the authentication machine, different ways of ID 
transmission, and elector’s database.
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As shown in this design for the authentication sys-
tem, N-version programming methodology could be 
a first-rate approach to solving a very difficult prob-
lem. That means that each e-voting system must have 
M different ways to transmit partial vote counts to 
the totalizing centre (see Figure 4). Therefore, to 
cover a large-scale state election, N different e-voting 
systems are needed, each one having M different ways 
of data transmission.
At the Central Electoral Office, there would be P 
different modules, the goal of which would be to re-
ceive and check data transmitted using each different 
transmission method. Each module would generate 
an XML message that’s sent to all the modules in the 
next stage with any parameters these modules need. 
At this point, the N-version execution environment 
would execute the different decision algorithms (one 
per each module) and the “most likely correct” in-
put would be elected as an input for this module. 
There would be M Totalizing Centers and all of them 
would be in charge of calculating final results. Each 
module would also generate an XML message con-
taining final results, which would be sent to the X 
results Web servers where, after approval by authori-
ties, they would be made publicly available. (Based 
on the concept of N-version technology, the system 
should be implemented using several Web servers, X 
being an undefined number. Each Web server takes 
as input data coming from all the Totalizing Cent-
ers and uses the decision algorithm to check data; if 
OK, it publishes the results.) At this stage, the NVEX 
would also run the decision algorithm to make sure 
that final results match.
W e understand that e-government is the future, and our e-voting system means a first step to 
support it.  Electronic counting of votes implies a bet-
ter accuracy level than hand counting.  Our system 
also helps voters avoid errors when depositing their 
vote, and it costs less money than traditional ways of 
voting (less human resources needed).
Possibilities for the future would be to create an 
audio output (upon scanning) to earphones on the 
Demotek, thereby letting all voters confirm that the 
system interpreted the vote as they intended. If this 
audio output were recorded, it would complement the 
paper and electronic record with a record the voters 
could hear as they deposited their ballot. Yet another 
possibility is to redesign Demotek and make it pos-
sible for voters to vote using any device connected to 
the Internet or intranet. 
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